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Evidence Problems in Juvenile Delinquency
Proceedings
Ronald J. Harpst*S OME OF THE MOST PERPLEXING PROBLEMS facing the attorney
defending a child charged with a delinquency have their in-
ception in misunderstandings, lack of uniformity and loose appli-
cation of evidential rules.
An attorney who is accustomed to appearing in criminal and
tort actions in courts other than Juvenile Court, tends to be
somewhat confused by such items as delinquency charges, weight
and sufficiency of evidence, use of extra-judicial reports, and the
loose application of technical rules of evidence.
In order to serve the best interests of the children who are
before it, and to obtain necessary facts with which to formulate
a rehabilitation plan, the courts have a tendency to waive strict
adherence to evidence rules. The methodical attorney wonders
how the court can serve the best interests of the child and yet
seemingly not afford to the child the equal protection of its laws
of evidence.
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence to Sustain a Finding of
Delinquency
Youthful offenders are charged with offenses which, if com-
mitted by an adult, would constitute a crime and would there-
fore require the burden of proof to be beyond a reasonable
doubt. In the case of the juvenile offender such alleged offenses
are not deemed crimes, but delinquencies. A juvenile delinquent
is an infant who violates a law or is incorrigible.' The courts con-
sider the hearing on the delinquency as a means to determine
whether the minor is in need of the protection, care or training
of the state as a substitute or supplement for parental authority.
The theory behind such action evolves from the old English
common law principle of the sovereign acting as parens patriae,
which today is applied in civil procedure.
* B.A., Gannon College, and studies at George Washington University and
Baldwin-Wallace College; LL.B., Cleveland-Marshall Law School; Probation
Officer and Assistant Boys Referee, Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court.
1 Black, Law Dictionary, 514 (4th ed. 1951). See, Young, A Synopsis of
Ohio Juvenile Court Law, 31 U. Cinc. L. R. (2) 131 (Spring 1962); Sympo-
sium on Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court, 10 Clev-Mar. L. R. (3) 507
(Sept. 1961).
2 260 N. Y. 171, 183 N. E. 353, 86 ALR 1001 (1932).
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The majority view is set forth in the much cited New York
case of People v. Lewis2 which held that in juvenile proceedings
"customary rules of evidence, shown by long experience as essen-
tial to getting at the truth with reasonable certainty in civil
trials, must be adhered to .. . and findings of facts in such cases
must rest on a preponderance of evidence adduced under rules
of evidence applying in civil trials."
Although a delinquent act is not deemed to be a crime, a
specific form of delinquency must be charged in the complaint
and must be established by evidence.3 Evidence of the commis-
sion of a crime, is admissible in the proceeding, although the
procedure is civil and not criminal. The theory is that civil
proceedings comprehend every conceivable cause of action except
those criminal in the "usual" sense.4
All fifty of the United States and the District of Columbia
have adopted the civil test of evidence weight.5
In a minority of jurisdictions, while juvenile proceedings are
recognized as civil proceedings, "criminal" delinquencies have to
be proved with the same degree of certainty as any other criminal
charge. In a few jurisdictions6 proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is required.
Confessions or Admissions
The admissibility of signed statements and verbal admissions
of youthful offenders made to police officials, school authorities,
store detectives, social workers, etc. differs somewhat from the
rule governing actions involving adults. There is a distinct split
in the cases regarding the use of evidence based on confessions
or admissions of minors. The real controversy centers around
the self-incriminating nature of the statements.
The majority of jurisdictions holds that because juvenile
procedures are civil in nature, and not criminal, the safeguards
against self-incrimination do not apply. This proposition has been
carried to great lengths. In the Michigan case of Re Broughton,
7
the court received no testimony but committed a minor on the
basis of a "full investigation," made by a court worker, which
found the minor admitting his guilt. In a similar Texas case, a
3 Re Mei, 122 N. J. Eq. 125, 192 A. 80, 110 ALR 1080 (1937).
4 Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184, 60 ALR 1325 (1928).
5 Pee v. United States, 274 F. 2d 556; 561-2 (C. A., D. C., 1959).
6 Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S. E. 2d 444 (1946); In re Madik,
233 App. Div. 12, 251 N. Y. S. 765 (1931); In re James Rich, 86 N. Y. S. 2d
308 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N. Y. C. 1949).
7 192 Mich. 418, 158 N. W. 884 (1916).
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minor was found to be delinquent at a hearing where no evidence
was introduced other than the minor's name, age and extra-
judicial confession."
A number of states follow the principle that where an adjudi-
cation is based on admission, insufficient or inadmissible in other
courts and made by a minor during the delinquency proceeding,
it will be upheld, even though the court did not advise the minor
as to the self-incriminating effect of the testimony.9 In the
Pennsylvania case of Re Holmes,'0 the court reasoned that a
child, questioned by Juvenile Court, "in a manner and in the
same spirit as a parent might have acted," was not improperly
compelled to give a self-incriminating answer to a question.
There are many courts which oppose the aforementioned
principle. They consider self-incriminating confessions of minors
an invalid basis for a finding of delinquency. In the oft-mentioned
case of People v. Fitzgerald" a child was found to be delinquent
on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice and on his own
confession, which was extorted by threats. The court held such
evidence to be insufficient and reasoned that:
... our activities in behalf of the child may have awakened,
but the fundamental ideas of criminal procedure have not
changed. These require a definite charge, a hearing, compe-
tent proof, and a judgment. Anything less is arbitrary.
On the same rationale as the Fitzgerald case, other cases
have held that a charge, established on a confession and plea of
guilty of a minor, where no witnesses were sworn or examined,
nor testimony taken, is invalid. 12 Juvenile proceedings, too, must
be governed by customary rules of evidence. A finding cannot
be based on compelled self-incriminating testimony, regardless
of the social desirability of obtaining testimony. 13
Dealing with confessions extracted by illegal means, the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Haley v. State
of Ohio14 ruled that a confession made by a fifteen-year old boy,
8 Saliz v. State, 142 Tex. Crim. 278, 152 S. W. 2d 367 (1941).
9 In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183 P. 2d 282 (1947); Re Holmes, 379
Pa. 599, 109 A. 2d 523 (1954); Re Mont, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A. 2d 460
(1954); Ballard v. State, 192 S. W. 2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); People v.
Lewis, supra, n. 2.
10 Re Holmes, supra, n. 9.
11 244 N. Y. 307, 155 N. E. 584 (1927).
12 People ex rel. Pelty v. Brewer, 232 App. Div. 1, 248 N. Y. S. 599, affd.
256 N. Y. 558, 177 N. E. 139 (1932).
13 Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S. W. 2d 269 (1944).
14 36 Ohio Op. 530, 79 Ohio App. 237, 72 N. E. 2d 785 (1948).
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after several hours of questioning commencing after midnight by
relays of police officers, and without aid of counsel or being
advised of his rights, is inadmissible because it is involuntary
and has been obtained by methods which violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justice Douglas reasoned that:
Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He
can not be judged by the more exacting standards of ma-
turity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed
can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This
is the period of great instability which the crisis of adoles-
cence produces. A 15 year old lad, questioned through the
dead of night by relays of police is a ready victim of in-
quisition . . . He needs counsel and support if he is not to
become the victim first of fear, then of panic.
Judge Ketcham, of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court,
recently rejected oral statements made to police officers, by
alleged youthful offenders, admitting their involvement in a case
of assault and attempted robbery. The statements had been
made at an early hour at police headquarters and without par-
ents, relatives or counsel to guide the statements. The court
theorized that the juvenile judge's decision must be based on
established facts in order to lay a foundation for corrective and
rehabilitive procedures, and unless it is so, "it will fall like a
house built upon quicksand." 15 Wigmore, noted authority on
evidence, states that the principal reason for the inadmissibility
of a confession is that under certain conditions it becomes un-
trustworthy as testimony.1 6 In juvenile matters the issue is not
whether the statements were voluntary but whether they were
trustworthy. The juvenile judges' decision must rest upon the
facts surrounding the making of the confession or admission and
not upon whether it was voluntary or not. In considering the
facts of this case, Judge Ketcham ruled that the statements were
not testimonially trustworthy and were therefore inadmissible.
His rationale centered primarily on the theory that youthful
offenders, under pressure of interrogation, in a fearsome locale
and without the aid of someone to guide them as to their rights,
tend to make and sign statements, in order to terminate the
questioning and to get home to their parents.'
15 Guides for "Juvenile Court Judges," National Parole and Probation As-
sociation 1957, pp. 58-61 (no author listed).
16 3 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 822 (3rd ed.).
17 As quoted in Note, Distrust of Confessions, 7 Crime and Delinquency J.
(3) 278 (July, 1961).
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In matters where a jury is impaneled, the lawyer, by proper
and timely motion, can keep an inappropriate statement from
consideration by the jury. In Juvenile Court the judge sits as
the trier of facts and interpreter of the law. As such, he must
hear the questioned statement before ruling on its admissibility.
What effect the statement carries in the judge's subjective
thoughts, only the judge himself can answer. Judge Harry East-
man, president emeritus of the Juvenile Court Judges' Council,
has written that:
... the judge must insist on a reasonable application of the
rules of evidence. He may not conclude-and his profes-
sional training and code do not allow him to conclude-that
a child must have committed the delinquent act specified in
the petition simply because he had previously manifested
bad behavior in general. The judge's training requires that
he stand firm on this point, even if it means resisting the
demands of quite naturally indignant people.' 8
Hearsay
Probably the most frequent evidence problems, in juvenile
proceedings, involve hearsay testimony. Hearsay manifests it-
self frequently in the numerous reports submitted to the court.
It may be a presentation of a police complaint by an officer who
did not make the investigation, a school report charging incor-
rigible behavior without the presence of the witness to such
alleged behavior, a probation officer's report of statements made
to him, or even a psychiatric report read by a social worker.
The leading case on hearsay is People v. Lewis.19 The Court,
in a lengthy opinion covering a large area of juvenile law, stated:
* , . to serve the social purpose for which it (the court) was
created, provisions are made by statute for wide investiga-
tions before, during and after the hearing. Investigations are
clinical in nature and their results are not to be used as legal
evidence where an issue of fact is to be tried ... The finding
of fact must rest on the preponderance of evidence adduced
under the rules. Hearsay, opinion, gossip, bias, prejudice,
trends of hostile neighborhood feeling, the hopes and fears
of social workers, are all sources of error and have no more
place in Juvenile Court than in any other court.
18 Eastman, The Juvenile Court Judge's Job, 5 National Probation & Parole
Assoc. J. 416 (Oct. 1959).
19 People v. Lewis, supra, n. 2; In re Mantell, 62 Neb. 900, 62 N. W. 2d 308,
43 ALR 2d 1142 (1954).
Sept., 1962
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The majority of American jurisdictions follow the rule of
People v. Lewis. Some representative states are, Nebraska,
20
Ohio,21 California, 22 Wisconsin,23 and Texas.
24
The minority rule is illustrated by the Pennsylvania case of
Re Holmes, 25 which held that Juvenile Court may avoid many of
the legalistic features of rules of evidence customarily applied
to other judicial hearings. The court further stated that hearsay
evidence, admitted without objection, relevant and material to
the issue, is to be given its "natural and probative effect" and
may be received as direct evidence.
The Holmes opinion has been strongly criticized. Chief Jus-
tice Musmanno, of Pennsylvania's Supreme Court, dissented
vigorously, stating that the holding of the majority was "an amaz-
ing paradox in jurisprudence." He said:
... that certain constitutional and legal guarantees such as
immunity against self-incrimination, prohibition of hearsay,
interdiction of exparte and secret reports, all so zealously
upheld in decisions from Alabama to Wyoming, are to be
jettisoned in Pennsylvania when a person at the bar of jus-
tice is a tender aged boy or girl.
A juvenile court delinquency proceeding, he stated:
... may be designated a hearing or a civil inquiry, . . . but
in substance and form it is a trial-a momentous trial which
means more than one which confronts an adult, because in
the Juvenile Court trial the defendant's whole mature life
still lies before him. And no matter how trained and ex-
perienced a Juvenile Court judge may be he cannot by any
magical fishing rod draw forth the truth out of a confused
sea of speculation, rumor, suspicion and hearsay. He must
follow certain procedures which the wisdom of centuries
have established.
The admission of hearsay evidence, in juvenile delinquency
proceedings, is one of the by-products of the informal atmosphere
of the court. Informality should not, however, mean an absence
20 In re Mantell, supra, n. 19.
21 State v. Shardell, 8 Ohio Op. 2d 262, 107 Ohio App. 388, 79 Ohio L. Abs.
534, 153 N. E. 2d 510 (1958).
22 In re Hill, 78 Cal. App. 23, 247 P. 591 (1926).
23 Harry v. State, 246 Wis. 69, 16 N. W. 2d 390 (1944).
24 Ballard v. State, supra, n. 9.
25 Re Holmes, supra, n. 9.
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of those technicalities which are essential to justice and which do
not tend to confuse or intimidate a child.2 6
Use of Ex Parte Probation Officer Reports and Background
Reports
The Background Report is probably the least uniform func-
tion of the delinquency hearings. Although it is not evidence in
the technical sense, it can appear to be evidence and in some
instances is used as such, almost to the effect of being incrimi-
nating hearsay testimony.
The confusion surrounding Background Report results from
two distinct views as to when it should be presented. The Syra-
cuse Law Review conducted a survey of Juvenile Judges in order
to obtain their opinions on the Background Report's proper use.
Surprisingly, the opinions were almost evenly split. Those who
preferred consultation before and during the hearing, but before
the adjudication of delinquency, reasoned that:
1. It serves best the interest of child and State;
2. The child has a tendency to talk more freely to the pro-
bation officer than in court;
3. Such consultation sometimes eliminates the necessity of
the child's appearance;
4. It prevents loss of wages by parents;
5. It enables the judge to gain a better insight into the
child's problems, and better evaluation of his testimony.
The reasons set forth by the judges desiring the use of these
Reports prior to making a finding of delinquency are based on
sociological factors, and not on laws guaranteeing rights.2 7
The opposite view, as followed in most jurisdictions, regard-
less of the trend of opinion, remains that, where an issue of fact
is concerned, the child is entitled to a hearing free of hearsay
and opinion. Background Reports are clinical in nature. Their
use is proper only after a finding of delinquency and for the pur-
poses of discovering what prompted the child's conduct and
what proper disposition should be made for the purpose of re-
habilitation.28
26 Standards for Specialized Courts Dealing with Children, prepared by
Children's Bureau, U. S. Dept. Health, Educ. and Welfare, U. S. Govt. Print-
ing Office (Washington, 1954), p. 54.
27 Cherif, Correct Use of Background Reports in Juvenile Delinquency
Cases, 5 Syracuse L. R. 67 (1953).
28 People v. Lewis, supra, n. 2; Re Holmes, supra, n. 9.
Sept., 1962
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1962
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
Sworn Testimony
The United States Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, in its publication on "Standards For Specialized Courts
Dealing With Children," points out that persons giving testimony
should do so under oath .2 In practice this legal necessity is often
ignored. This further result of the relaxation of rules of evidence
is due primarily to two reasons: first, informality of procedure;
secondly, infrequency of attorney appearances. The second rea-
son adds to the growth of the first reason.
The general rule is set forth in Re Mantell,30 a Nebraska de-
cision. The court held that an adjudication of delinquency will
not lie where a juvenile judge admitted unsworn testimony over
the objection of the defendant. The court reasoned that to allow
such testimony would destroy the traditional and customary
safeguards of treatment and would amount to trial without bene-
fit of testimony under sanction of oath or affirmation. The court
further stated that the legislature, in enacting juvenile laws, did
not intend to deprive a child of liberty with less formality than
in the case of an adult.
There are exceptions to the aforementioned rule. The Wis-
consin case of State v. Schol131 held that, where it seems neces-
sary to take a child, who was previously on probation, perma-
nently from his home and to consign him to the care of a state
institution, due process is not violated by lack of sworn testimony.
The court reasoned that "investigations of the probation officer
and the facts brought out by the kindly questioning of the judge
upon the hearing substantiate the fact of delinquency fully as
well as sworn testimony."
A further exception to the rule set forth in Re Mantell con-
siders the more practical problem of age of the witness. The
court, in the case of State ex rel. Christensen,2 held that if the
court deems it advisable, in its discretion and in regard to a
matter of procedure, not to administer an oath to a child witness
because of age (in this case the witnesses were in the lower ele-
mentary grades) where such witness does not appreciate the
29 Standards for Specialized Courts Dealing with Children, supra, n. 26, at
p. 56.
30 Re Mantell, supra, n. 19. See also, Re Sippy, 97 A. 2d 455 (D. C. Mun.
App. 1953); Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 88 P. 609, 120 Am. S. Rept. 935
(1907),
31 State v. Scholl, 167 Wis. 504, 167 N. W. 830 (1918).
32 227 P. 2d 760 (4th Jud. Dist. Utah Juv. Ct., 1954).
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meaning of the oath, but is likely to state facts as he knows them,
a finding of delinquency based on such testimony will be upheld.
Elements of Delinquency Charges
A cardinal principle of Juvenile Court is that no child under
18 years of age is considered to be a criminal nor shall be charged
with or be convicted of a crime. Such child is looked upon as
being in need of care, guidance and control; i.e., a "delinquent."
Much confusion has resulted in referrals involving state and
local violation, as terminology used by such agencies normally
refers to offenses by adults.
Some specific form of delinquency must be charged.3 3 It is
not sufficient to charge a child with being a "juvenile delinquent."
This term is as generic as charging an adult of being guilty of
"a crime." The charge must be reasonably definite and specific
in order to allow the accused to prepare his defense.34
This point is further illustrated by Healy & Bronner in the
following statement:
The terms by which delinquency is designated-larceny,
truancy, breaking and entering, and so on are descriptions
of behavior which do not in the least indicate what is ex-
pressed by the offender in the delinquent act. While it seems
necessary to have labels for such types of conduct, yet it
must be recognized in all common sense, that naming the
offense reveals nothing of the determinants of the behavior.35
Although delinquency charges are, in essence, descriptions
of behavior, they require specific allegations and definite evi-
dence.
Reference to the Cuyahoga County (Ohio) Probation Of-
ficers Manual is a starting point for attorneys, subject to the
requirements of the particular jurisdiction, to ascertain the com-
mon charges and their elements. 36 The elements of proof of the
various delinquency charges are identical with elements of cor-
responding torts or crimes. The main variance exists in the
burden of proof necessary in order to sustain the delinquency
charge. The difference must be comprehended if the lawyer is to
prepare an adequate defense for a child client.
33 People v. Pikunas, 260 N. Y. 72, 182 N. E. 675, 85 ALR 1097 (1932).
34 Re Mei, supra, n. 3.
35 New Light on Delinquency and Its Treatment, Yale University Press
(1936), pp. 3-4.
36 Cuyahoga County (Ohio) Probation Officers Manual, pp. 609-613 (cur-
rent ed.).
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